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Abstract
Quantitative research on the “durability” of peace following civil wars typically captures
the breakdown or survival of “peace” in a binary manner, equating it with the presence or
absence of civil war recurrence. In the datasets that underpin such studies, years that do
not experience full-scale civil war are implicitly coded as “peaceful.” Yet, post-civil war
environments may remain free from war recurrence, while nevertheless experiencing
endemic violent crime, state repression, low-intensity political violence, and systematic
violence against marginalized groups, all of which are incongruent with the concept of
peace. Approaches to assessing post-civil war outcomes which focus exclusively on civil
war recurrence risk overestimating the “durability” of peace, implicitly designating as
“peaceful” a range of environments which may be anything but. In this article, we discuss
the heterogeneity of violent post-civil war outcomes and develop a typology of “varieties
of post-civil war violence.”Our typology contributes to the study of post-civil war peace
durability, by serving as the basis for an alternative, categorical conceptualization of
“peace years” in conflict datasets.
Keywords
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terrorism
Introduction
Most quantitative studies that examine the varying “durability” of peace following civil
war essentially equate “peace” with the absence of civil war recurrence (Florea, 2012).
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The durability of peace is measured in a binary fashion, as whether a civil war “recurs”
within a specified time frame, or as the time until civil war recurs. In Mason’s (2019)
recent overview of the quantitative evidence on the durability of peace, all the studies
reviewed adopted one of these two approaches. However, the threat of organized violence
after civil wars end is not limited to their potential resumption. The aftermath of civil war
is often characterized by uncertain and contested political authority (Florea, 2018a), weak
state capacity (DeRouen et al., 2010), and economic devastation (Licklider, 1993), all of
which can make for a particularly febrile environment in which society is vulnerable to
multiple forms of organized violence, which may undermine the “durability” of peace.
For example, while the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) did not “recur,” in the decade
following the Nationalist victory hundreds of thousands of suspected republicans and
communists were put to death at the hands of the state (Holguı́n, 2015). The 1971 civil war
in Pakistan that resulted in the secession of Bangladesh did not “recur” either, though soon
after independence marginalized indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hills took up arms
in pursuit of greater autonomy (Dowlah, 2013). The post-Qadhafi landscape in Libya
continues to be dominated by hundreds of small, competing armed groups in a country
that since 2011 “has lacked not only a central authority worthy of that name, but also
strong national political or military forces, as well as stable local authorities” (Lacher,
2020: 1).
In this article, we argue that a minimalist conceptualization of peace, which equates it
with the absence of civil war occurrence, does not adequately capture the heterogeneity of
outcomes that countries may experience in the aftermath of civil wars. By advancing this
claim, we contribute to a growing body of work which explores the variability of post-
civil war outcomes. Several scholars have made the case that forms of violence short of
civil war recurrence should not be overlooked when assessing the durability or quality of
post-civil war peace. Suhrke (2012), for example, explores the vulnerabilities to violence
of various types of “post-war” peace, namely, “victor’s peace,” “loser’s peace,” “divided
peace,” and “pacified peace.” These various forms of post-war peace are classified ac-
cording to “the nature of the war, the way it ended in terms of the political bargain and
balance of power on the ground, the political-normative framework for the new post-war
order, and the presence and absence of institutions for managing violence…” (5). Another
effort to systematize understandings of the different “varieties” of “peace” which may
emerge after civil wars is that of Jarstad et al. (2019), who have sought to “identify,
characterize and theorize the multiple, diverse forms of peace that can be empirically
observed in post-war societies” (2).
Rather than exploring varieties of post-conflict peace, we focus instead on the het-
erogeneity of post-civil war environments which continue to experience significant levels
of organized violence. Such outcomes cannot be described as forms of “peace,” though
they are often implicitly labeled as such by quantitative studies when they fall short of full-
scale civil war recurrence. In other words, it is not our purpose to describe different
varieties of post-civil war peace, but rather varieties of post-civil war violence. These are
compatible goals, not least because descriptions of “the variety of ways in which peace
manifests itself in the aftermath of armed conflict” (Jarstad et al., 2019: 4) should be
coupled with an understanding of the plurality of violent processes that can undermine
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peace. In this way, the full heterogeneity of post-conflict outcomes can be explored,
whether these are peaceful, or violent. To this end, our key contributions in this article are
a discussion of the varieties of violence that can occur in the aftermath of civil war and a
typology to empirically categorize these varieties. It is hoped that this will provide greater
theoretical and methodological clarity around post-conflict outcomes, therefore facili-
tating further comparative empirical work on the subject. For example, a clear typology of
post-conflict outcomes could allow researchers to more effectively investigate enduring
empirical questions, such as whether victories or negotiated settlements tend to result in
different forms of post-war violence.
As noted above, we are not alone in advocating that other forms of organized violence
beyond civil war recurrence be considered in assessments of peace durability, nor is the
typology we present the first of its kind. Boyle (2014) in particular has produced a
compelling argument which both describes and seeks to explain the prevalence of various
forms of strategic violence that may occur in post-conflict states, including the con-
tinuation of wartime violence as well as violence organized around new political
cleavages. His work presents three ideal-type categories of violent act—expressive,
instrumental, and strategic—and differentiates these “by the nature of the intention behind
the act” (25) and the identity of victims to create a typology of “violent actions.” Corinne
Bara, Annekatrin Deglow and Sebastian van Baalen (2021) have noted that civil war
recurrence is often studied separately from other forms of post-war violence, and propose
a conceptual framework which seeks to encompass “all forms of physical violence
committed after a civil war has been terminated…” (3). Their framework is based on three
dimensions—whether the state is involved, whether organized non-state groups are
involved, and whether the violence is driven by a political incompatibility—and identifies
eight forms of post-war violence. Grandi (2013) has also offered a typology of post-war
violence, based on an assessment of strategic aims and the degree of organization of
perpetrators. The approach we outline is simpler, but also broader than these previous
efforts. Rather than classifying “violent actions” as strategic or otherwise, our typology
aims to classify broader “varieties of organized violence” which can be deployed as a
descriptor of the prevailing situation in a given country in a given post-conflict year.When
classifying these varieties of organized violence, we reserve judgment as to the intentions
(whether strategic or not) which drive them and hence avoid the “epistemological problem
of detecting intentions for violent action” with which Boyle grapples (2014: 24). We also
avoid attributing intention to forms of violence both because we believe this to be mutable
(the strategic intent of violent actors is liable to change over time) and contested by violent
actors themselves, as attested to by the fragmentation that they often experience.
The typology that we offer instead looks to three more immediately observable
patterns of actor behavior as a basis for classification; the type of actors involved; the
targets of violence, and the violent methods deployed. Using these three dimensions, we
identify five “varieties” of post-civil war violence: (1) civil war recurrence, (2) subsequent
civil war, (3) residual political violence, (4) criminal violence, and (5) state violence. In
this sense, our work builds on that of Chrissie Steenkamp (2011) who highlights the
salience of political, social, and economic violence that can occur at different levels
during the implementation of peace accords, but does not offer an explicit typology for
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cross-case comparison. There are also similarities between the categories included within
our typology and those identified in Bara et al.’s (2021) conceptual framework. Our
typology, however, is more aggregated, comprising five as opposed to eight categories,
and does not assess the presence or character of political incompatibilities. Instead, it is
based on three observable dimensions relating to actor identity and behavior and is hence
well-adapted for large-N studies which necessitate the coding of outcomes for potentially
hundreds of cases over multiple years.
The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. Firstly, to underline the
relevance of our typology, we provide a brief overview of our argument that binary
measures of peace durability do not adequately capture the heterogeneity of violent post-
civil war outcomes. We also discuss why existing efforts to broaden the concept of
“peace” do not appear to have permeated the quantitative literature on the durability of
peace. We then establish the conceptual basis for our alternative approach by analyzing
the varieties of violent threat that can emerge in post-civil war environments. Finally, we
offer a typology of five post-civil war “varieties of violence”which can be used to capture
outcomes at an annual level.
Binary measures of peace and their shortcomings
Most quantitative studies of post-civil war outcomes adopt a unidimensional concept of
peace, equating it with the absence of civil war recurrence (Fortna, 2003; Mason, 2019;
Quinn et al., 2007; Toft, 2010a; etc.). Coding decisions as to whether a given civil war
“recurs” are typically made using a “battle-deaths threshold.” For example, Jana Krause,
Werner Krause, and Piia Bränfors Krause et al. (2018) code “recurrence” when a
minimum of 25 battle-related deaths occur in a calendar year, while Monica Duffy Toft
(2010b) adopts a higher threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths. This essentially binary
approach to assessing peace durability is convenient for the development of outcome
variables in statistical models. Yet, conceptual validity can be improved if other varieties
of violence are considered, including those which may not meet the specified casualty
thresholds for “recurrence” (Florea, 2012), or which cannot be captured by quantifying
battle-related deaths simply because they do not assume the shape of “battle.”
There are numerous examples that illustrate the tendency of post-civil war envi-
ronments to experience violent outcomes that are inimical to the very idea of “peace,” but
which fall short of civil war recurrence. For instance, one influential study (Toft, 2010b)
has pointed to El Salvador and Uganda as examples of “durable” peace following re-
spectively a negotiated settlement and a rebel victory. In both cases, this finding is called
into question if a broader lens is applied which takes account of varieties of violence
beyond civil war recurrence. In the years following the negotiated end to El Salvador’s
civil war, the country came to experience one of the world’s highest rates of organized
violent crime (Hume, 2007: 741), much of it perpetrated by “demobilized” combatants.
As for Uganda, the country experienced several years of armed conflict in its northern
regions as members of the defeated government’s armed forces re-mobilized to resist the
new order (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008; Mutibwa, 1992; Tripp, 2010). The experience of the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) also illustrates the shortcomings of a binary,
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minimalist conceptualization of peace when assessing post-civil war outcomes. The two
regional wars which tore the DRC apart following the ousting of the long-term dicta-
torship of Mobutu Sese Seko, and which resulted in nearly two million (mostly civilian)
deaths (Nzongola Ntalaja, 2002) came to a “formal” close in 2001 with “Global and All-
Inclusive Peace” accord signed in South Africa. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) and the UCDP’s Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz,
2010) both record no incidents of further conflict until 2005. From a minimalist point of
view, this would suggest that the “peace” survived for at least four years after the accords
were signed. A more realistic view, however, would suggest that “peace” never emerged
at all. Irrespective of the political achievements of the agreement in terms of power-
sharing and nascent institution-building, the years following the accord were charac-
terized by the continuing presence of multiple armed groups in the east of the country who
clashed repeatedly among themselves, with government forces, and with the United
Nations peacekeeping mission deployed in the country (De Heredia, 2017). The Inter-
national Crisis Group estimates that during this period of ostensible “transition,” up to
1000 people were dying daily as a result of the ongoing insecurity and its wider impact
(ICG, 2005). This highlights gaps in datasets and related studies which are based pri-
marily on battle deaths. More broadly, these examples illustrate that the absence of civil
war recurrence alone sets a very low bar for assessing the “durability” of post-war peace.
Nevertheless, binary conceptualizations of peace remain the norm in quantitative
studies of post-civil war outcomes. This is despite a number of scholars who have argued
for a broader theoretical view of peace (Florea, 2012; Harbom et al., 2008; Höglund and
Kovacs, 2010; Jarstad et al., 2019). Most of these efforts to widen the concept of peace
have sought to capture the various “positive” dimensions of peace as first outlined by
Galtung (1969), who argues that while the “absence of violence” remains a valid principle
when assessing peace, this must take into account an extended concept of violence to
include “structural” violence, understood as societal inequalities—particularly in the
distribution of power and resources—which prevent individuals from realizing their
potential. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given this rather expansive starting point, many of these
recent approaches have adopted exceptionally broad canvases. Kristine Höglund and
Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs (2010), for example, build on Galtung’s work to propose a
“peace triangle,” which calls for the analysis of attitudes, behaviors, and issues when
assessing the quality of post-conflict peace. Similarly, in a bid to transcend the negative
versus positive peace dichotomy, Peter Wallensteen (2015) has outlined the concept of
“quality peace,” which entails both the resolution of the incompatibility that resulted in
conflict, but also the establishment of post-war conditions which “make the inhabitants of
a society (be it an area, a country, a region, a continent, or a planet) secure in life and
dignity now and for the foreseeable future.” (6) Caplan (2019) similarly argues that
because peace can be a relative term, with different meanings in different contexts,
assessments of its robustness should take into account the “beliefs, opinions, and
preferences of those directly involved, which, to a large extent will be the outgrowth of
local historical experience and local value systems.” (107) Such understandings of peace
necessitate an in-depth understanding of the context of each society for which the analysis
is conducted. For this reason, in their entirety, they are unlikely to inform the development
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of a feasible approach to measuring peace durability for quantitative research. Jarstad et al.
(2019), for example, explicitly note that their framework for analyzing varieties of peace
is best suited for application to qualitative case studies.
These efforts to broaden the concept of peace should certainly be welcomed as a much-
needed drive to capture the variety of outcomes which emerge in the wake of violent
conflict. Their multi-dimensional approach and long-term horizons make themwell suited
to the in-depth analysis of specific conflict situations, perhaps with a view to designing
and implementing interventions aimed to improve the prospects for lasting peace.
However, they are generally not well suited for large-N cross national studies because
their micro-level, multi-dimensional, context-dependent, and long-term emphases cannot
easily be distilled into a viable and valid outcome variable. This is reflected by the fact that
as far as we are aware, no major quantitative study of the durability of peace has utilized
an outcome variable which goes much beyond a dichotomous judgment of whether a
conflict “recurred.” Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis’ (2000) article on peace-
building is one possible exception, but only insofar as it captures whether or not a
“minimum standard of democratization” occurs in addition to the end of war, residual
violence, and contested sovereignty. In the end, their dependent variable remains a binary
assessment of whether a peacekeeping deployment was a failure or a success (Doyle and
Sambanis, 2000). Another exception is Joshi’s (2020) article, which explores the rela-
tionship between post-civil war one-sided violence and peace agreement implementation.
We believe that quantitative studies can yield valuable insights into the nature of post-
conflict environments, but that this potential can be more fully realized with a dis-
aggregated measure that captures the diverse set of violent outcomes short of civil war
recurrence, but which are not “peaceful.” This is undoubtedly a challenging task, but it is
not one that researchers should shy away from, not least because the years implicitly
coded as “peaceful” (i.e., those in which casualty counts did not reach the level required
for “civil war” coding) by conventional civil war datasets are not analytically equivalent,
and treating them as such can lead to a conflation of “positive peace” with “negative
peace” (Florea, 2012). Our article seeks to address this issue by proposing a concep-
tualization of “peace durability” which considers a given post-war environment’s re-
silience to various forms of organized violence. In defining “organized violence,” we
adopt Tilly’s (2003) definition of collective violence, as comprising deliberate acts which
inflict physical damage on persons or property, and result at least in part from coordination
among persons who perform the damaging acts. Any effort to define the exact time period
for which it remains appropriate to define a given context as “post-civil war” is vulnerable
to charges of arbitrariness. That said, we suggest a period of ten years because this is a
short enough period for the legacies of warfare, such as armed actor and cleavage
persistence, to be observable, but also sufficiently long for variation in the type and
magnitude of organized violence to occur.
To operationalize our concept of “peace durability,”we first provide an overview of the
different varieties of organized violence that can emerge in the aftermath of civil war, and
then outline a typology for classifying these using three dimensions. As noted above,
others too have highlighted the vulnerabilities of post-war environments to various forms
of violence (Boyle, 2014; Grandi, 2013; Steenkamp, 2011; Suhrke, 2012). Our article
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draws on these previous works to develop a straightforward typology for classifying
varieties of post-civil war violence across numerous cases.
Varieties of post-civil war violence and conflict
This section establishes the conceptual basis for the typology that we propose in the
subsequent section. Here, we review the varieties and sources of violence that societies
can experience in the aftermath of civil wars which fall short of war recurrence. In this
sense, we seek to identify and describe the various violent phenomena that may occur
during the “peace years” found in conventional conflict onset and termination datasets.
Violence beyond the state
Most studies of civil war onset, duration, and termination are state-centric in their focus.
This is understandable given that civil war is often defined as a condition of multiple, or
fragmented, sovereignty, in which armed non-state groups violently contest a state’s
authority within a given territory (Florea, 2018b; Quinn et al., 2007). A state-centric
approach is reflected in many prominent datasets on civil conflict (Kreutz, 2010;
Pettersson et al., 2019; Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). Quantitative work that analyzes
these datasets typically examines the influence of state characteristics, such as level of
development, regime type, geography, and ethnic competition, on the risk of civil war
onset, outcome, or resumption (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Mason and Greig, 2016; Phayal
et al., 2019; Quinn et al., 2007).
In order to explore the wider variety of post-civil war outcomes beyond war recurrence,
it is helpful to examine research which explores social, organizational, and individual
dimensions of civil war (Debos, 2016; Kalyvas, 2003, 2006; Lacher, 2020; Lombard,
2016). Kalyvas (2006), for example, has argued that social cleavages and rivalries,
particularly at the local level, are as much a product of wartime experiences as they are a
cause, and that reasons for individual participation in violent acts may have little to do
with the state-level objectives espoused by leaders of armed groups. One implication of
this is that peace agreements or other forms of civil war termination may address the state-
level objectives over which wars were ostensibly fought, while social cleavages in
communities forged or cemented by the experience of wartime violence may persist and
become a lingering source of resentment and, potentially, renewed violence. This can risk
undermining the “durability” of post-war peace. For example, in the aftermath of the 2013
Seleka rebel takeover, the Central African Republic witnessed widespread and largely
uncoordinated violence in the form of revenge killings and lynchings, in which the state—
insofar as it could even reasonably be said to exist—played no part (Lombard, 2016;
Smith, 2015). Similarly, in Libya, the post-Qadhafi era has been characterized by violent
contestation between rival militia in which the state has “existed only as a vestige, not as
an actor in the conflicts” (Lacher, 2020). In Somalia, when Mohamed Siad Barre was
overthrown by the United Somali Congress (USC), “law and order” broke down so
absolutely that it became virtually impossible to “distinguish between the violence
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committed by marauding soldiers, USC fighters and supporters, or simply armed bands of
robbers” (Kapteijns, 2012: 118).
In some cases, more organized non-state actors may persist in the aftermath of civil war
and challenge the state indirectly, though rarely or only sporadically engaging in active
conflict against the government. Such actors might include pro-state militias, locally
organized defense groups or other violent specialists that were formed during war and for
whom post-war demobilization is not perceived to be in their members’ best interests. The
persistence of these groups is inimical to the project of building a durable peace in both
principle and practice. In principle, they represent a parallel monopoly of violence that
implicitly undermines the authority of the state. In practice, such groups are often violent
and unaccountable, meaning that even in the absence of outright civil war the population
is unable to enjoy many of the most tangible benefits of peace, including security of
persons and property. In Chad, for example, dozens of armed groups, formed throughout
decades of chaotic civil conflict, persist to this day, and play a highly visible and semi-
formal role in Chadian politics, manning ad-hoc customs checkpoints and local defense
groups, occasionally assisting government forces against rebel incursions, and all the
while negotiating access to state positions and resources (Debos, 2016). In the aftermath
of the 2001 war in Afghanistan, a host of regional warlords rose to prominence, many of
them maintaining local power throughout the various stages of the post-invasion in-
surgency by developing symbiotic relationships with the national government and in-
ternational actors (Malejacq, 2016). Such environments, characterized by some as “grey
zone conflicts” in which “low intensity is a key characteristic and hostilities frequently
emerge between parties that are politically and economically interdependent” (Belo and
Carment, 2019) should be considered when assessing the durability of post-war peace.
While they are likely to be associated with considerably less violence than outright
hostilities between armed groups and the state, they nevertheless represent a situation in
which control of organized violence is decentralized, which can be used to negotiate
access to state positions and resources, or engage in other profitable activity which is
beyond the ambit of the state.
Another “non-state” form of violence which can emerge in the aftermath of civil war is
criminal violence. This may arise due to a failure to reintegrate former combatants, a lack
of alternative livelihood options, or the state’s inability to uphold the rule of law. In some
instances, the intensity and sophistication of criminal violence can be so great as to lead
some scholars to describe situations such as the conflict between the Mexican government
and various drug trafficking organizations as “criminal insurgency” (Bergal, 2010;
Correa-Cabrera, 2017; Sullivan, 2009: 2). In El Salvador and Guatemala, both post-war
states, drug-related violence has reached a scope and intensity similar to that of Mexico.
Most scholars have maintained, however, that large scale criminal violence and civil wars
should be treated as conceptually distinct because of important differences between the
motivations and objectives of participants of rebel groups and criminal groups (Gersovitz
and Kriger, 2013; Kalyvas, 2015; Sanı́n, 2004). As such, outbreaks of criminal violence in
the aftermath of war, irrespective of how high their casualty counts may be, should not be
treated as an instance of civil war recurrence. Instead, given the intensity that criminal
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violence can potentially assume, it is crucial to consider it as a conceptually distinct
outcome when assessing post-war peace.
A crucial point to raise relating to “violence beyond the state” is that its victims may be
marginalized groups located at the social and geographical peripheries, meaning it may be
particularly challenging to detect. Proxy measurements of peace outcomes which rely on
conventional conflict datasets typically capture deaths resulting directly from “battle”
events. While casualty figures ostensibly include civilians, data are rarely disaggregated,
and almost never capture violence against marginalized groups such as women, children,
and ethnic or religious minorities. This lack of attention to marginalized groups plays into
a public/private distinction which de-politicizes the experience of certain groups, while
privileging the experience of others, a process which may commence during peace
negotiations and can continue into the post-conflict environment (Aolain, 2006).
To a certain extent, such an uneven focus is inevitable. Not all such violence is related
to the conditions prevalent in post-war environments, and therefore, it is not always
necessarily relevant to studies of post-war peace durability. This is particularly true of
highly individualized forms of interpersonal violence. However, there is substantial
evidence linking such non-political violence to the after-effects of wars. For example,
intimate partner violence (Bradley, 2018) and self-harm (O’Connor et al., 2014) are both
affected by wartime experience, while there is evidence of post-war crime waves
emerging in the aftermath of numerous civil conflicts. In some cases, such violence is so
widespread and systematic that its presence may indicate a breakdown of peace. For
example, in post-conflict Guatemala, gender-based violence has occurred at an intensity
and with a level of organization that surpasses any usual understanding of domestic
violence, drawing condemnation from around the world (Ruhl, 2007: 199–200). Such
violence is better understood as femicide, or “the killing of females by males because they
are female” (Russell and Harmes, 2001: 3 original emphasis). The high levels of femicide
in Guatemala and other post-conflict societies can be partially understood as a result of
engrained patriarchal norms, the legacy of war, and the associated normalization of
violence (Carey and Torres, 2010: 160; Steenkamp, 2005). However, it is also shaped by
the political and institutional legacies which connect the past conflict to the current
political system. State-sponsored sexual violence from during the conflict was never
punished, with many of the perpetrators continuing to serve in politics and the security
services (Manjoo andMcRaith, 2011: 28). As Victoria Sanford argues, there is a clear line
between unpunished wartime sexual abuse and the current failure to protect women
(2008). This permissive attitude towards gender-based violence partially explains how
street gangs have come to treat violence against women as a rite of passage (Sørensen,
2014: 213). However, beyond this, there is evidence that femicide in Guatemala functions
as form of social cleansing, with the collaboration of elements within the state and the
police force (Sanford, 2008). The mutilation and public display of female bodies served as
a warning against social or political transgression during the civil war, and continues to
function in a similar way today (Carey and Torres, 2010; Sanford, 2008).
The varieties of non-state violence outlined above are important to consider in
assessments of post-civil war environments. For various reasons, they are overlooked
by many of major datasets which are used for evaluating the durability of peace, which
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tend to focus exclusively on conflict between the state and armed groups which exceed
a certain threshold. That said, some datasets do exist which seek to capture such
violence in which the state plays no obvious role, for example, the ACLED database
(Raleigh et al., 2010) and the UCDP non-state violence dataset. However, these
datasets have clear limitations, particularly when looking at less recent cases. To our
knowledge, most existing quantitative studies of the durability of peace have not made
use of these resources when assessing the durability of post-civil war peace.
Violence by the state
An exclusive focus on civil war occurrence also ignores another important source of post-
conflict violence and insecurity: the state itself. Many post-war societies experience
significant state repression, often perpetrated by a hybrid of state security forces and
paramilitary groups (Carey and González, 2021). This may be directed against former
rebels or perceived “counter-revolutionaries,” but may also involve state-aligned
forces targeting the population for political, personal, or economic reasons. For
example, post-conflict Guatemala saw state forces attack protestors (Granovsky-
Larsen, 2018; Yagenova, 2015: 329–311), assassinate transitional justice activists
(Curiel, 2007; D’Aubuisson and Dudley, 2017) and extort communities in former
rebel areas (Löfving, 2004). In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s victory in Cuba in 1959,
suspected counter-revolutionaries and their sympathizers were persecuted by revo-
lutionary militias and committees, and Cuban jails soon incarcerated more political
prisoners than under any other previous regime (Thomas, 1986). The level of violence
committed by the Khmer Rouge following their capture of power in Cambodia in 1975
reached what some commentators have described as “genocidal” proportions
(Chandler, 1991; Kiernan, 2002). Other cases such as Rwanda, North Korea and
Vietnam have been highlighted as examples of “repressive peace” (Eck, 2015; Samset,
2011). This refers to contexts which are politically “stable” insofar as the state enjoys
a monopoly over the use of organized violence, but whereby a regime’s hold on power
is maintained through severe internal repression. Davenport has also argued that
countries which have experienced civil war are more likely to emerge into a state of
“tyrannical peace” Davenport (2007), in which the government violates both civil
liberties and personal integrity.
State violence of this sort is typically not considered in quantitative assessments of the
“durability of peace,” and this is reflected in the major datasets underpinning research on
the subject. The UCDP dataset on one-sided violence does attempt to systematically
capture the incidence of state violence, but as far as we are aware the information that it
contains has not been used to enrich quantitative studies on the durability of post-war
peace.
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A typology of varieties of post-civil war violence
In this section, we draw on the discussion above to present a typology of potential violent
post-civil war outcomes which can enhance the literature on the durability of peace. This
typology is based on three dimensions:
1. The identity of the actors involved (i.e., the perpetrators).
2. The identity of the targets (i.e., the victims).
3. The violent methods employed.
By combining these dimensions, we present a typology of five possible outcomes
which can characterize the “peace years” implicit in conventional civil war datasets.
These categories are not mutually exclusive. The varieties of violence experienced in each
post-war environment are liable to change over years and the experience of one variety of
violence does not preclude the experience of others, whether at a later point in time or
simultaneously. Any combination of these varieties of violence, we argue, is grounds for
suspecting that while a country may not be “at war,” it also cannot be said to be ex-
periencing a “durable peace.” Considering the presence or absence of these various forms
of violence provides us with a multi-dimensional view of the “durability” of post-civil war
peace.
It is important to reiterate that the categories we identify represent an attempt to clarify,
refine and systematize post-war violence in a way which can facilitate comparative
research. Many studies and datasets exist which contain useful information on the va-
rieties of post-civil war violence that we describe, and we aim to highlight these where it is
possible.
Civil war recurrence
Definition. The protagonists of the previous civil war resume hostilities, and the resultant
fighting meets or exceeds the casualty threshold for definition as civil war, typically set at
1000 battle deaths in a calendar year.
Identity of actors. Civil war recurrence has the benefit of being relatively easy to identify. It
involves the resumption of armed hostilities by the belligerents of a recently concluded
civil war, usually over the same core incompatibility.
Identity of the targets. In instances of civil war recurrence, the armed forces of the state and
rebel groups target one another. Civilians are also often targeted by both government and
rebel forces, often deliberately, though sometimes inadvertently as a result of indis-
criminate tactics (Kalyvas, 2006; Stanton, 2016; Weinstein, 2007).
Methods employed. The methods employed in instances of recurrence will likely resemble
those of the recently concluded war. If the balance of power between the two sides is
relatively even, recurrence is likely to resemble conventional warfare. If there is a high
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degree of asymmetry between the two sides, the weaker party is likely to resort to guerilla
warfare or clandestine political violence (Della Porta, 2013). A key criterion, however, is
that fighting between the belligerents reaches a specified intensity threshold for it to
constitute civil war. Numerous studies and datasets have established this threshold at 1000
battle-related deaths in calendar year.
Subsequent civil war
Definition. Hostilities break out between protagonists that are different from the previous
civil war, and the resultant fighting meets or exceeds the casualty threshold for definition
as civil war, typically set at 1000 battle deaths in a calendar year.
Identity of actors. The distinction between civil war recurrence and a subsequent civil war
breaking out is not always made in studies of the durability of peace, with some defining
peace “as continuing until the war resumes with the same pair of protagonists,” and others
as “ending when any new civil war occurs” (Mason et al., 2011). We argue that when
assessing the durability of post-civil war peace, it is important to distinguish between civil
war recurrence and a subsequent civil war breaking out, not least because the causes of
each may be different.
While civil war recurrence involves a resumption of a preceding civil war by the same
protagonists fighting over the same incompatibility, a subsequent civil conflict should be
understood as the outbreak of a conflict that reaches the defined intensity threshold for
civil war, and which involves at least one “new” belligerent. The distinction between civil
war recurrence and a subsequent civil war can be illustrated by way of example. For
instance, in Angola, intense fighting between the government and National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels resumed following peace agreements in
both 1992 and 1998. These were clear cases of civil war recurrence, given that the
violence involved the same actors fighting over the same issues, at a level of intensity that
meets the definitional requirements for civil war. However, in the years following the
overthrow of Qadhafi in Libya, high intensity fighting broke out among the various militia
groups that had cooperated to overthrow the dictator and by 2014 had reached such a
magnitude that it could be classified as a new civil war (Lacher, 2020; Laessing, 2020).
We argue that while cases such as Angola can be understood as conflict recurrence,
cases like Libya are more accurately classified as subsequent civil war. This analytical
distinction is important because the two forms of violence may have different antecedents.
Recurrence, for example, presupposes that both belligerents’ organizational structures
and potential military capacities survive the termination of the previous civil war. This
could happen for several reasons, including the failure or lack of demobilization efforts,
such as in Angola, or because the nominally “defeated” party fled to a territory not
controlled by the state and was able to rearm and renew hostilities, such as in Rwanda in
the aftermath of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)’s victory, or in Chad after Hissène
Habré was expelled by Idriss Déby’s rebels. At the same time, a subsequent conflict may
indicate that background conditions such as state weakness or economic inequality are
driving new types of conflict. These are not novel categories, but in our opinion represent
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an important clarification which is too often overlooked in the existing quantitative
literature.
Identity of the targets. As with civil war recurrence, in subsequent civil wars, the armed
forces of state and non-state actors target one another, though civilians are also often
targeted, either deliberately or inadvertently.
Methods employed. Like civil war recurrence, the methods employed in subsequent civil
wars will vary in nature from irregular, highly asymmetrical warfare to more conventional
warfare, often depending on the balance of power between the belligerents.
Residual political violence
Definition. Armed non-state actors, formed prior to or during the previous civil war, persist
in the post-civil war environment and carry out acts of political violence against state
targets, other non-state actors, and/or civilians. The conflict does not meet the casualty
threshold for definition as civil war, typically set at 1000 battle deaths in a calendar year.
Identity of actors. Residual political violence typically occurs in post-civil war contexts
where the state does not command a monopoly of violence, but where the damage re-
sulting from hostilities between antagonistic armed groups does not reach the level
required for definition as “civil war.” Residual political violence thus refers to low-
intensity violence such as assassinations, bombings, and sporadic attacks perpetrated by
non-state groups. Its “residual” quality derives from the fact that the perpetrators are in
some way linked to the preceding civil war, often because they are non-state actors such as
rebel or paramilitary groups that failed to demobilize following the formal cessation of
hostilities, or alternatively new groups formed to violently contest the post-war status quo.
This differentiates it from idiosyncratic terrorism, which is “unique, unusual, or unex-
pected, given the type of terrorism and time period” (Norris, 2020: 4).
Identity of targets. Residual violence may be directed towards a variety of targets. Non-
state groups may target each other, government forces and infrastructure, or civilians. A
distinguishing feature of residual violence is its low intensity, which does not meet the
threshold for definition of a state of civil war.
Methods employed. Residual violence is also distinguishable from other varieties of post-
civil war violence because of the methods employed by violent actors. In contexts of
residual violence, actors adopt a range of methods which fall short of full-scale guerilla or
conventional warfare, such as assassinations, kidnappings, terrorist attacks, and extortion,
among others. In this sense, the methods employed resemble those embodied by the
concept of “clandestine political violence” as outlined by Della Porta (2013). Residual
violence may also involve some evolution in the participating organizations and tactics
deployed, as well as a change in the intensity of violence. But it also involves crucial
points of continuity in terms of the political cleavages and actors involved. As discussed
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previously, Guatemala moved from a left-wing versus right-wing civil war characterized
by rural insurgency and counterinsurgency to an environment of right-wing para-
militarism and targeted assassinations, alongside rampant street crime (Ystanes, 2016:
227–231). The key actors moved from being the official army to clandestine paramilitary
groups, the goals changed from outright victory to intimidation and impunity, and the
tactics shifted from counterinsurgency to targeted killings. However, this right-wing
political violence was not novel or idiosyncratic but was rather an evolution of the
dynamics present during the height of the conflict.
Such residual violence has long been a feature of post-civil war environments. In the
aftermath of the American Civil War in the 1860s, some members of the defeated side
organized themselves into paramilitary groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and the White
League to pursue violence against ex-slaves (Horwitz and Anderson, 2009: 128–130). In
the late 1940s and early 1950s, after the Costa Rican civil war ended with the Ejército de
Liberación Nacional (ELN) capturing state power, unreconciled elements of the ousted
regime withdrew to neighboring Nicaragua and attempted a number of daring, yet in-
variably unsuccessful attempts to violently sabotage and destabilize the new government
(Bowman, 2002).
Drawing on data from more modern civil wars, Aliyev (2019) has argued that the
presence of pro-government militias can undermine post-civil war peacebuilding efforts
because a full end to conflict would result in their demobilization and the loss of op-
portunities for private gain. Instead, their preferred outcome is often a situation of “no
peace, no war” in which they can continue to survive and profit. Evidence from several
contemporary post-civil war contexts indicates that non-state groups, including but not
limited to pro-government militias, thrive in such contexts. Chad, for example, has long
stagnated in what Debos (2016) has described as the “inter-war”: “spaces and times that
are affected by violence even if there is no direct fighting between rebel an governmental
forces,” in which a plethora of armed groups subsist through engagement in a variety of
formally illicit activities, typically involving the extortion of unarmed civilians. Louisa
Lombard (2016: 22) has described a similar situation in the Central African Republic,
where despite many years of peacebuilding efforts by international organizations,
“pluralized capacities for violence” remain the norm, as armed groups continue to be
present, “either as standing forces or as networks that could easily be re-mobilized.” In El
Salvador, Douglas Farah (Farah, 1996) has observed how even after the signing of peace
accords, right-wing paramilitary groups continued to assassinate moderates and leftists.
Measuring such violence is made difficult by its often-clandestine nature and therefore
may require case-by-case research. However, the Global Terrorism Database, UCDPOne-
Sided Violence dataset and ACLED have all collected data related to residual violence,
showing the potential for cross-case empirical work.
Criminal violence/insurgency
Definition. Armed non-state actors, formed during the preceding civil war or its immediate
aftermath, carry out acts of violence against state targets, other non-state actors, and
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civilians while pursuing illicit economic activities, including drug production and dis-
tribution, piracy, smuggling, and banditry.
Identity of actors. The perpetrators of this category of post-civil war violence are non-state
actors explicitly engaged in illicit economic activities, including drug production and
distribution, piracy, smuggling, or banditry. To use Varese’s (2017) definition, criminal
groups are organizations which attempt “to regulate and control the production and
distribution of a given commodity or service unlawfully.” While groups engaged in
criminal violence do not make attempts to capture government power, their presence and
activities clearly undermine state authority.
Identity of targets. The targets and victims of criminal groups are likely to vary across
cases. Often however, they will include rival criminal groups, state security forces, and
civilians.
Methods employed. To control their illicit activities, criminal groups in post-civil war
environments have adopted a range of tactics. Typically, criminal violence will involve
low-intensity methods, such as targeted killings, kidnappings, and extortion. On occasion
however, criminal violence may involve acts resulting in mass casualties. This may occur,
for example, when criminal groups engage in sustained hostilities with state security
services or other non-state actors (including rival criminal organizations), or when they
adopt tactics such as indiscriminate bombings or deliberate massacres of civilians.
This variety of violence is common across a range of post-civil war environments. El
Salvador is a frequently cited example of significant criminal violence in the aftermath of
civil war (Call, 2003; England, 2012). In post-civil war Libya, several of the militia
groups that had organized to overthrow Qadhafi all but abandoned any pretense of
“governing,” and became engaged primarily in smuggling people, oil, and weapons to
neighboring countries (Lacher, 2020; Laessing, 2020). The rise of piracy off the Somali
coast in the aftermath of Siad Barre’s overthrow by the USC in 1991, which had enormous
implications for global shipping, is another example of essentially “criminal” post-civil
war violence (Harper, 2012).
We acknowledge that criminal violence can be difficult to distinguish from residual
violence, not least because groups with explicitly political objectives often do engage in
criminal enterprises to finance their activities. For example, right-wing paramilitary
groups in Colombia that were formed during the country’s civil war continued engaging in
criminal activities following the signing of the peace agreement (Daly, 2016; Nussio and
Howe, 2016). Many of the armed groups that have operated in Afghanistan since the early
1990s have financed their activities through opium production and smuggling (Sinno,
2011). To distinguish purely criminal violence from political violence that is financed by
criminal activity, it is necessary to carefully assess the role played by the actors involved.
If groups seek to replace government authority by establishing alternative political and
administrative structures, and providing public services, or alternatively seek co-option
within the folds of government, then the associated violence may be classified as more
than purely “criminal.” If, however, groups do not take steps to replace or become
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absorbed into government authority structures, but instead aim to coerce, co-opt, or
corrupt the state in order to establish more favorable conditions for illicit activities, then
the violence may be considered primarily “criminal” in nature. This distinction draws on
the argument advanced by Sullivan (2012), who argues that the defining characteristic of
“criminal insurgency” is that “criminal insurgents’ sole political motive is to gain au-
tonomy and economic control over territory.”
State violence
Definition. The state has a monopoly or near-monopoly on the means of coercion and uses
this to systematically carry out violence against perceived enemies, both individual and
organizational.
Identity of actors. This category of post-conflict violence is distinguishable because the
primary perpetrator is the state. Other organized violent actors, if present, lack the ca-
pacity to perpetrate sustained violence, often because the state’s security apparatus is
highly effective at identifying and eliminating potential threats.
Identity of targets. State violence typically targets real or perceived political opponents,
whether organized as formal non-state groups or not. For example, following victories by
communist rebel groups in China (1949) and Cambodia (1975), hundreds of thousands of
civilians were killed by state security forces for perceived counter-revolutionary crimes
(Chandler, 1991; Dikotter, 2013; Walder, 2015). In Spain, the decade following the
Nationalist victory witnessed extensive state violence against perceived opponents of the
Franco regime, with estimates of the death toll ranging from 150,000 (Casanova et al.,
2002: 8) to 200,000 (Beevor, 2012: 94).
The targets of state violence may also be non-state actors committed to armed re-
sistance against the state. In these instances, what distinguishes state violence from civil
war recurrence, subsequent civil wars, or residual violence, is that it occurs within a
context defined by extreme asymmetry of coercive capacity between the groups involved.
Organized groups committed to the violent overthrow of the state may exist, and their
presence provides a rationale for state repression, but they lack the ability to pose any
serious threat to the security of the regime. In Cuba, for example, Fidel Castro’s fledgling
regime faced sporadic armed resistance in the hills of the Oriente province throughout the
early 1960s (Brown, 2017). The state’s response to this threat, and other threats from
perceived “counter-revolutionary” elements, was highly repressive. Militias and Com-
mittees for the Defense of the Revolution, which saw mass participation, were established
to root out and eliminate counter-revolutionary threats (Fagen, 1966), and thousands of
individuals were imprisoned (Thomas, 1986). The “bandido” counter-revolutionaries in
the countryside never posed a serious threat to Castro’s regime, and by 1965, the state’s
coercive apparatus “reigned supreme throughout the hinterlands” (Brown, 2017).
Somewhat similarly, after the Khmer Rouge captured power in Cambodia, some members
of the defeated Republican leadership escaped to Thailand, where they began “talking up
ambitious resistance plans” (Conboy, 2013: 27). The actual threat posed to the Khmer
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Rouge regime, however, was negligible. The largest counter-revolutionary group boldly
declared its intention to attract 7000 armed recruits, but in reality its numbers “never
exceeded 800, just a tiny fraction of which had access to weapons” (Conboy, 2013). As
Daniel Bultmann summarizes, such groups were principally “fighting for their own
survival and could not mount a serious attempt to overthrow the communist regime”
(Bultmann, 2018). Undoubtedly, however, the presence of such organized threats to the
Khmer Rouge fueled the regime’s extreme paranoia and zealous persecution of perceived
counter-revolutionaries which would see up to 2 million citizens perish (Chandler, 1991).
In cases where organized groups do eventually attain the ability to provide a serious
challenge to the regime, state violence may be better categorized as civil war recurrence, a
subsequent civil war, or residual violence, depending on the magnitude of hostilities. A
transition from highly asymmetrical state violence to another form of violence would be
evident from an increase in casualties resulting from confrontations between the state and
hostile non-state groups.
Methods employed
The methods of violence in this category differ from the other varieties explored, again
principally because it occurs in a context in which the state enjoys a monopoly of coercion.
While assassinations, massacres and bombings may occur, violence is also likely to become
bureaucratized through mass imprisonment, routine surveillance, and the establishment of
specialized state security organs. The state may also encourage mass participation in re-
pression of real and perceived enemies. In addition to the Cuban example highlighted
above, in post-civil war China, several counter-revolutionary campaigns exhorted mass
participation in the identification and denunciation of “class enemies” and other threats,
resulting in widespread imprisonments and executions (Dikotter, 2013; Walder, 2015).
The extent to which this form of violence is carried out openly will depend on the
context, most importantly on how far the state is willing to go to appear democratic. In
some cases, political executions will be conducted openly, while in others death squads
and extrajudicial violence will give some degree of plausible deniability to the gov-
ernment. Numerous datasets addressing state violence already exist, including the Po-
litical Terror Scale (Gibney et al., 2019) and CIRI Human Rights Project (Cingranelli
et al., 2014), facilitating the inclusion of this form of violence in our understanding or
measurement of post-conflict outcomes. Table 1 provides a summary of our typology of
post-civil war violence.
We consider the presence of any of the five varieties of post-civil war violence
discussed above to be inimical to the maintenance of a durable and effective peace
because of their direct, negative impact on the security of the population, expanding the
potential to foster conditions for future conflict escalation as violent actors remain
mobilized. The absence of these five varieties of post-civil war violence may not nec-
essarily equate to “positive peace,” given that they are silent as to the prevalence of
“structural violence.” However, a post-civil war environment which does not experience
these varieties of organized violence does suggest that political competition is managed in
a generally non-violent manner, which we believe is indicative of a more “durable peace.”
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We acknowledge that this approach sets a very high bar for “durable peace” to be
realized, given that any one of the five violent outcomes identified, if present, renders the
label inapplicable. This contrasts with those studies which, by measuring the durability of
peace through civil war recurrence, set a very low bar. The demanding standard implied
by our approach is appropriate, however. It is preferable to describe as “peaceful” only
those contexts which meet a relatively strict set of criteria than risk inaccurately labeling
as such situations which may not approach the definitional requirements for civil war, but
in which the lives of ordinary people are nevertheless plagued by the threat of organized
violence. One consequence of adopting such a high bar is that few countries are likely to
qualify as experiencing a “durable peace,” at least during the first years following civil
war termination. The majority are likely to experience at least one of the forms of post-
civil war violence outlined above. Among those countries that do appear to have settled
quite rapidly into a durable post-civil war peace using this approach, we can point to Costa
Rica following its 1948 civil war, Croatia after 1995 and Tajikistan from 2001.
Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that a binary approach to assessing the durability of post-civil
war peace which looks only to the presence or absence of war recurrence does not adequately
capture the heterogeneity of violent outcomes that different countries may experience. This
risks overestimating the durability of a given peace, as other forms of violence beyond civil
war recurrence are ignored. To address this issue, we have drawn on existing literature to
review the various forms of violence that can emerge in the aftermath of civil war, and
advanced a straightforward typology which can be used to categorize these. This typology,
which is based on observable patterns of actor behavior and identity, is a refinement and
systematization of existing concepts from across the qualitative and quantitative literature on
peace and conflict. It is our hope that it may contribute to the development of a categorical
approach to assessing the durability of peace in the aftermath of civil wars, which can augment
existing measures of post-conflict outcomes and facilitate further empirical research.
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